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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a divorce decree rendered by the
Honorable Phillip R. Fishier of the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County.

Utah Code Annotated 1953 section

78-2a-3(2)(g) provides that the Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction over domestic relations cases.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Four issues are presented for review, although
plaintiff's Brief separates the issues into nine points. The
issues are:
1.

Did the Court abuse its discretion in awarding

custody of the children to the defendant?
2.

Did the Court abuse its discretion in its child sup-

port award in light of plaintiff's substantial income?
3.

Did the Court abuse its discretion in valuing and

dividing the assets of the parties?
4.

Is the plaintiff entitled to attorney's fees in

bringing this appeal?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS!
The interpretation of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 15, U.C.A. §30-3-5(3) and §78-45-7(2) are relevant to this
appeal.

The rule and statutes are set forth in Addendum 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of a divorce decree.

Plaintiff, Eddie

Ebbert, sued defendant, Barbara Ebbert, for divorce on the grounds

1

of mental cruelty.

His complaint alleged that the defendant

should have custody of the parties' two daughters with specific
visitation rights to the plaintiff, and that the defendant should
receive certain marital property.
Long before trial the defendant informed the plaintiff
that she intended to move to Colorado.

During trial the plain-

tiff apparently decided he wanted custody of the children and
accused the defendant of child abuse.

The court upon hearing

plaintiff's testimony offered to stop the trial and order a
custody evaluation.

Plaintiff decided to retract his statements,

withdrawing custody as a contested issue.

Both parties received

a portion of the marital assets and debts; plaintiff was ordered
to pay child support and to pay nominal alimony.

Each party was

ordered to pay his or her own attorney's fees.
Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on June 10,
1985.

(Record 2-11).

July 22, 1985.

Defendant answered and counterclaimed on

(Record 12-17).

The parties on November 10, 1985

stipulated to a settlement of the action including that custody
of their children was to be with the defendant, wife and mother.
(Record 315-326).

But the parties were thereafter unable to agree

upon the form of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment and Decree of Divorce, and upon motion of the defendant
(Record 165-68) the stipulation was set aside (Record 205) and
trial was held on March 27, 1986.

2

At trial both parties appeared, represented by counsel,
and offered testimony and exhibits.
court below ruled on the matter.

At the close of trial the

(Record 328-345).

He awarded

custody of the children to the defendant in accordance with the
plaintiff's complaint, the defendant's answer and counterclaim
and the prior stipulation of the parties.

(Record 329) . He

ordered defendant to pay child support of $325 per month per
child (Record 330); and he awarded alimony of $1,00 per year for
two years to defendant (Record 3 30) ; he divided the property and
debts of the parties (Record 329-332) and at the insistence of
the plaintiff, established a specific visitation schedule (Record
332-342).

The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law and a Judgment and Decree of Divorce on May 15, 1986.
Defendant moved for a new trial on May 27, 1986 on the
issues of child support, child custody and property division.
(Record 276-77).

A hearing was held on plaintiff's motion for

new trial on July 1, 1986 and the court denied the motion the
same day.

(Record 284, 384-364).

notice of appeal.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a

(Record 289-90).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties were married in June of 1976.

(Record 2).

They are the parents of two daughters ages seven and five.
(Record 2). Plaintiff works as a manufacturer representative and
earns approximately $36,500 per year, plus an automobile provided
by his employer.

(Record 587).

Defendant worked periodically as

3

a bank teller during the marriage and is capable of earning
approximately $1,300 per month.

(Record 408).

During the marriage

the defendant's parents gave the parties many gifts in the form
of property and cash which greatly improved the financial circumstances of the family.

(Record 389, 414, 442, 457, 470).

Both parties pleaded that the children should be in the
custody of their mother, the defendant.

(Record 3, 14). When

the case initially settled plaintiff agreed that the defendant
should be the custodial parent.

(Record 304). After the plain-

tiff filed for divorce (June of 1985) he and the defendant
discussed the custody and visitation situation in September of
1985 (Record 578) and the defendant told the plaintiff that she
was planning to move to Colorado.

(Record 578). During the

trial plaintiff attempted to amend his pleadings and pray for
custody of the children (Record 620). Defendant's counsel
objected to that attempt (Record 619) and the trial court denied
the motion to amend citing concerns over plaintiff's advance
notice of the issue and his failure to move to amend before
trial.

(Record 621). Later in the trial the plaintiff testified

that defendant had physically abused the children (Record 624)
and that he should have custody.

The trial court then offered to

suspend the proceedings and order a custody evaluation.
625).

(Record

The plaintiff declined the court's offer and instead

retracted his statements related to custody issues.
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(Record 625) .

At the close of trial the court awarded permanent
custod1,

f,

(

-*'i"i

•"'•••- JAfendar+' with specific visita-

*

tion rights -. requested .
2 41-254).

liie

'Fe^:-: ;

«\

-

^ r* -1 :- - finding that the defendant *':. a :.

mother and a f
children."

-r.e . _a^r/--.:.

. ^-

- -

e-.-r^ 256-57)
--

chl 1 d suppor*" -** ' " ""

custody

~* : ^ 4 t
month

-

the]

ordered plainer: .. pay

er er : I i arc -cm:-".a I alir.cry

(one dollar
The parties were ordered ~

iav

neir ~w

attorneys'

aes.

(Record 2 64 ) .

Ihe court tcurid Lh.it U"m iJiitie1 h-:id tuMl

insets of

$103,866.GG and liabilities of $10,175.00 resulting in a net
won th ''if $9 1,691.00.

(Record 259). The net worth of the parties

included gifts to the parties by the delenda'.i
totalling $93,433.00,
re

(Record 259).

s parents*

Plaintiff was awarded the

* household furnishings and his vested

savings p^a. benefit:
som*- -r

fc

t

-

*>- '^cr?

discharge

•
^ err :c:.

'°44-46) and he wis ordered Lo discharge

(Record 246) .
-Id

Similarly, defendant received

furnishings and was ordered to

* . debts.

(Recoi .: . ".

I'M.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT |
1.

"The i/"

JIIJIT'S

custody award was proper,

Both parties

pled that the defendant should have custody of the '. hildi*".
The court received evidence that defendant was a fit and proper

5

parent.

Plaintiff's contentions concerning judicial bias, inade-

quate findings, visitation, amendment of pleadings at trial are
unsupported by the record—the court did not abuse its discretion.
2.

The trial court's child support award was proper in

light of the totality of circumstances including the plaintiff's
and defendant's respective earning capacities.
3.

The court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating

and dividing the marital estate.

The court's property division

awarded substantial assets and debts to both parties in equitable
proportions.
4.

This court should not award plaintiff attorney's

fees in bringing this appeal because his income is sufficient to
enable him to bear his own expenses for this specious appeal.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The standard of review is an important preliminary consideration for this Court.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated:

Our standard of review in divorce proceedings allows us to disturb the action of the
trial court only when the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary or the trial court
has abused its discretion or misapplied principles of law. Subject to those limitations, we
are free to review both the facts and the law.
Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1985) [citations
omitted].
A more recent case held:
While we may review both the facts and law in
matters of equity, we also accord considerable

6

deference to the judgment of the trial court
and treat its findings with a presumption of
validity.
King v. King, 717 P.2d Tib tUtah nflh i.
Apply LL'j those standards to the facts of the case mardate affirmance of the decree of the trial court.
ARGUMENT
7

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN TO THE DEFENDANT
Ihn plaint I'M in Points 1 through VI of his brief
asserts that child custody was an issue at trial, that the
court below erred by tp^uqinq il ' -iik'w ylaintitt to amend his
pleadings <•»" trial, tLdt the trial judge was biased, and that the
court erred by making insufficient findings as. to custody
Plaintiff also claims ftM*
was L iiequinalle.

f

!J*J trial louit's

isitation schedule

Plaintiff's arguments are redundant, and this

Brief will address all ot the custody and visitation issues, in
this one section.
A.

Plaintiff did not Raise Custody Issues at Trial
Plaintiff's arguments concerning child

disingenuous and un'-upportPd by the record

^

wv

--

*

e

- •* plaintiff

filed tor divorce he specifically pleaded that tr.e defendant
should have custody of both children.

His —

•

•- •.

Defendant should be awarded the care, custody
and control of the parties1 minor children
subject to the defendant's right to liberal
visitation at minimum as follows,,..

7

;

(Record 3).

Five months later when the parties appeared at the

stipulation hearing the plaintiff agreed that defendant should be
custodial parent.

(Record 303).

Not until trial did the plaintiff attempt to raise
custody issues, but he later changed his mind and retracted his
statements related to custody:
Q. [by Mr. Hanson] Isn't there going to b e —
will that not create a financial burden on you
to attempt to see them every week?
A [by Eddie Ebbert] Not if I can have an
abatement clause for the time they're with me
and if she will pay the expense to get them
over here I'm afraid, if I don't see them
every week, for the kids physical health.
I've seen bruises on them too many times and
welts.
Mr. Cowley:

Oh, come on.

Mrs. Ebbert:

Oh, Eddie.

The Court: I think if that's what he's
saying, now—now you've done it because I'm
going to terminate this hearing right now,
here and now, and I am going to just stop and
we're going to have—I'm going to order a
custody evaluation. Now, do you want to
retract that statement, sir?
The Witness: Can I speak to him or you
or somebody? I—I'm not—I'm honest—
Mr. Hanson:

Just listen.

The Court: Are you telling me that you
have observed welts and bruises on these
children while they're in the custody of Mrs.
Ebbert that would lead you to believe that
these children are being physically abused?
The Witness: It was—no that's not, what
I said and I didn't mean that, that they're
being physically abused. How do I explain
this, exactly what's going on?

8

The Court: I think you better—let's
take a five-minute recess and I think you
better confer with Mr. Hanson. Because from
what you're saying, you've now put me—if what
you're saying is true, then I think that I
can, on my own motion, make custody an issue
because I'm not going to allow you two to stipulate to a custody situation which, in my
mind, would put the children at risk. And
from what you're saying, I think that's
exactly it. So let's take a five-minute
recess and you confer with Mr. Hanson. This
court will be I n recess for five minutes.
[Whereupon, a Brief recess was had? after
which, the following proceedings continued:]
The Court: RetUrn again to D85-2144.
You may proceed, Mr. Hanson.
Mr

F fa nson i

Th,ank \ ot i youx- nonor .

Q. (By Mr. Hanson) Mr. Ebbert, you
just had an opportunity in conference to
discuss your statement that was made " •:*court.
A,

,*:"-

Q.

And upoi 1 r \y ad < r:ii ce do i : i i now retract

that statement?
;

as.
Hanson:

No further questions, your

Hon'.- ..
(Record 624-2 5).
If is apparent from the record that Mi
to cnaJJenue Mi b

Ebbert sought

I bbp t f ' :< I itne?s in h >n H I'usfody and that the

court was willing to stop flie tijal, initiate »i custody evaluation ^nd '71 ve Mr

Ebbert a full hearing on who should have

custody ot tiie oui i lit»h,

Tie ccnr4: :*id;

if what you're saying is true, then I think
that 1 can, on my own motion, make custody an
9

issue because I'm not going to allow you to
stipulate to a custody situation which...would
put the children at risk.
(Record at 625).
Following the court's statement, and a recess, the
plaintiff, on advice of counsel, withdrew the custody issue by
retracting his statement that attempted to place custody in
issue.

Plaintiff waived trial of the custody issue by pleading

that the defendant should have custody.
Plaintiff asserts that custody was in issue because the
stipulation between the parties was set aside and the case went
to trial.

(Brief p. 15-16).

The plaintiff ignores the allegation

in his complaint that defendant should have custody.

He also

argues that defendant's denial of paragraph 4 of the Complaint
(pleading custody in the defendant) (Record 12) made custody an
issue.

(Brief p. 11). Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim

alleged that custody was proper in the defendant.

(Record 14).

Plaintiff also entered into a stipulation etwarding custody of the
children to the defendant.

(Record 303).

Therefore, the custody

issue was resolved by the pleadings and the only issues to be
tried were visitation rights, child support, alimony and property
division.

In a hearing before trial the court interrogated the

defendant about her parental fitness.

(Record 312). Thus, the

court had a solid basis for his custody decision even assuming
for the sake of argument that custody was in issue.

10

The distinction between custody issues and visitation
issue-

^ n u i £ f ? s Brief fails to recognize

-

the distinction,
disputed.

Visitation rights were clearly in issue inn

The trial excerpts, quoted at length in plaintiff's

B r i e f ( p p . 1 i -.-' 4 i , r e\» P -I I f ha 1 \, i s 11 at: i on# rather than custody,
•v . s v-.e f:x::_.; ;)f p^:;::::i f s arguments before the t.io'ii1', Ir r- J
Plaintiffmove
lay

-~tcrne*- stated that

..s questions concerning the

. . .-.

children were intended to

*. record

(Record 569}

regarding foundat . .. concerning visit; at urn
• * ~je - '"H shows that • e parties and the court

at the incii?- -

ex p e n mil .tnmh of the* trial.

establishing an extremely specific visitation schedule, a .i !,t
di i} e premised -~ -~- defendant serving as custodial parent.
(Record 332-J*-

,'J-84)

Because tr.e plaintiff pleaded that custody should re in
the iefendar it he is bound by the admissions of hi s pleadings.
Numerous cases have hel d that par t i e s ar • = b o u n d h / >-i s s e r 11 o n s
made In pleadings:
Normally factual assertions in pleadings and
pretrial orders are considered to be judicial
admissions conclusively binding on the party
who made them.
White v. Anco/Polymers, Inc., 7*u K-hi I o ]
198:
A-.

; see also, Thomasset v. Thomasset
-*

facts asserted therein).

i rie i rn i ii
^z > . ,

„e^

proceeding ^a^ <~ admission of
.. r . ... -

dant was the proper custodial parent.

LI

:

Plaintiff should not be allowed to open the custody
issue on appeal when he failed to timely and properly raise the
issue before trial.

Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090,

1092 (Utah 1978); Burnham v. Burnham, 7161 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah
1986).

The plaintiff declined the court's invitation to stop the

trial and evaluate the custody issue and plaintiff cannot now be
heard to complain on appeal about issues he intentionally omitted.
B.

Amendment of Pleadings
Error is also claimed because the court below did not

allow the plaintiff to amend his Complaint and plead for custody
of the children.

(Brief p. 18-2 0).

Plaintiff contends that the

trial court failed to follow Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
("U.R.C.P.") Rule 15. Conveniently omitted from plaintiff's
Brief are Utah cases on point.
The standard of appellate review regarding U.R.C.P. 15
is whether the court abused its discretion in refusing to allow
amendment of pleadings during trial.

Westley v. Farmers Insurance

Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983); Stratford v. Morgan, 689
P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984).

In Stratford, supra, the supreme

court upheld the trial court's decision not to allow amendment of
pleadings where the plaintiffs had intentionally omitted an issue
from prior pleadings and had represented to the court before
trial that the issue would not be litigated.

689 P.2d at 3 65.

Similarly in Westley, supra, the supreme court stated:
Although Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure tends to favor the granting of leave

12

t o a m e n a , trie m a t t e r r e m a i n s w i t n m t h e s o u n a
d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r a i l c o u r t . . . A n a m e n d m e n t
w o u l d c e r t a i n l y h a v e d e l a y e d t h e t r i a l and t h e
s u b s t a n c e of p l a i n t i f f ' s n e w a l l e g a t i o n w a s
k n o w n a full y e a r e a r l i e r w h e n p l a i n t i f f
d i s c u s s e d 1+" in h i s d e p o s i t i o n .
^

3 I" , ?;i a t

r

-4

Here, plaintiff admits that he discussed custody

issues,

i n c l u d i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s plai:re I IT-1"- K,-. C o l o r a d o , long b e f o r e t r i a l .
(Brief" p

Defendan 1 "" * planned

II, R e c o r d at 5 7 8 j .

m o v e to Colorado

'is apparent,;1,.;; why p l a i n t i f f d e c i d e d he w o u l d be the better
dial parent
trial

t -• < , I'-he p l a i n t i f f w a i t e d

'" . rn^'e *o a m e n d his p l e a d i n g and pt^/

children,

he v. .

discretion
C.

(Record 82 i

J; .

until

tcr c u s t o d y of the

T h e trial c o u r t did not a b u s e

in r e f u s i n g t o a r M t

custo-

Hey

p l a i n t i f f ' s m o t i o n to a m e n d ,

Judicial Bias Concerning Custody J
Plaintiff 1 -: s u b m i s s i o n of an a f f i d a v i t by K e n n M.

H a n s o n , h i s attorney

at trial,

dlleqin'f the trial c o u r t ' s

c o n c e r n in«i c u s t o d y i s s u e s is b o t h
(Brief, A d d e n d u m

,

bias

i n a c c u r a t e ai id i m p r o p e r .

I'lainti'f's c o u n s e l s t a t e s

in p a r t ;

11.
T h a t t h e r e w e r e t i m e s t h r o u g h o u t the
t r i a l w h e n t h e C o u r t ' s g e s t u r e s w e r e not
r e f l e c t e d on t h e r e c o r d , b u t w h i c h g e s t u r e s
w h e r e (sir v i n d i c a t i v e of t h e C o u r t ' s a t t i t u d e
and b i a s ,
J
12.
T h a t in o n e s u c h d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h e
C o u r t • s g e s t u r e s w e r e so p o i g n a n t as to c o e r c e
t h e A p p e l a n t to w i t h d r a w t e s t i m o n y r e g a r d i n g
t h e c h i l d r e n ' s p h y s i c a l h e a l t h and to b r i n g
t h e t r i a l to a p r e m a t u r e e n d . . . .
14.
T h a t d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h i s
d i s c u s s i o n t h e C o u r t g e s t u r e d in a d r a m a t i c ,
o v e r b e a r i n g and i n t i m i d a t i n g f a s h i o n ,

. 3

whereupon the Court came right out of the
bench, extending his arm and pointing his
finger at the Appellant•
(Brief, Addendum 1

p.3.).

Mr. Hanson's allegation that the court below made
gestures that were "so poignant as to coerce the Appellant to
withdraw testimony" is irresponsible.

It implies that the plain-

tiff was unrepresented by legal counsel at trial, and that plaintiff had no alternative, given the intimidating gestures of the
judge, other than retracting his statement concerning the health
safety of the children.

In fact, the record shows that Mr.

Hanson consulted with the plaintiff in private prior to plaintiff's retraction of his statements about child abuse.
625).

(Record

To accuse the court below of coercing a retraction from

the plaintiff of his statement concerning child abuse improperly
maligns the integrity of the court and fails to explain why trial
counsel did not preserve the issue for appellate review.

Absent

from the record is an objection by the plaintiff concerning judicial bias or a preservation of the "coercion" issue pursuant to
U.R.C.P. 63(b).

Thus, plaintiff's arguments regarding bias of

the trial judge and plaintiff's "involuntary" retraction of the
custody issue are not properly reviewable because plaintiff
failed to object, or to move for new trial because of judicial
bias.

(Record 266-72).

Meir v. Christensen, 389 P.2d 734 (Utah

1964) (comments by judge must be objected to in order to be
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reviewed on appeal ) ; Brannan v, siemp
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p <M '-r^

"'8/1

•

1971) (prejudicial mannerisms by trial court must be objected to
i

:

i,» eser v o 1*1 P1 e 1 1 at P T e v i e w ) .

H e n r i k s e n v . L y o n s f 6 5 2 P, 2d 19,

. (Wash.App, 1982) (where bias exists request for r^ersal L"i a
prerequisite •

appeal) .

• tffidt

Defendant s itr.orney could submit an
'ison-s statements.

However, this

Court does not have t .- ; ^ r : s a : c ^ i ^ n r +-he machi ner \ to r ecei /e
evidence an; determine whic^ iffiant
lefei v vit.

- correct.

-

Accordingly,

a meaningless affida-

A careful review of the entire record absolutely refutes

Mr. Hanson's improper allegation of bi as.
D.

Findings of Fact Respecting Custody1
Plaintiff claims that the court's Findings ct F3'.* M"

with respec* --* child custody was inadequate

(Brief p. 7-8)

I l'i*- Ji l 1 M )»:j l *••'i ' ni \ *:i n ini i-'OTnni a i ns a b o u c o y

l--.ai.nt lit

pleading that defendant should have custody, ; . waiting until
trial to attempt ~ - amend his pleadings and ::• declining ~ne.
court' s i n v i L a I

-1 vamp 1 et f--1 .:i - • •; - - -

~ ~ -on.

Plaintiff retracted his criticisms of defendant, s parent: -cr
skills (Record 625), and the record as a whole indicates that
defendant

is «/S y o o n m o t h e r ^ n n i i I- t-n hp f h p «'ijst-od i. ^ I p a r e n t .

(Record 312), The Utah Supreme Court has held:
In appropriate c a s e s — w h e r e the findings are
terse but still suggest the weight accorded to
the testimony of the witnesses by the trial
court, and outline the basis of the custody

award—we can find that there was competent
evidence to support the judgment so long as it
is not fso flagrantly unjust as to constitute
an abuse of discretion.'
Pennington v. Pennington, 711 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah 1985)
[citations omitted].
Here, the award was anything but a flagrantly unjust.
Rather, it conformed to plaintiff's own allegations.

The

plaintiff's complaint combined with the presumptive validity of
the Court's findings, King v. King, 717 P.2d 715 (Utah 1986) mandates affirmance of the custody award on appeal.
Plaintiff cites two Utah cases, Martinez v. Martinez,
728 P.2d 994 (Utah 1986) and Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah
1986) for the proposition that a trial court must make specific
findings regarding custody—at least more detailed than rendered
by the court below.

Plaintiff misconceives the holdings of

Martinez and Smith, supra.

In both those cases custody was

hotly contested at trial (Smith was a custody modification case)
and extensive evidence received about the parental fitness of
each party.

The cases teach that detailed findings are reguired

when custody is disputed at trial.

Here, both parties agreed

that defendant should have custody of the children, and any concerns plaintiff has with the court's findings on custody are
self-inflicted.

The Findings of Fact are amply supported by the

evidence and are more than adeguate to support the Judgment and
Decree of Divorce.

The court received evidence on the parental

fitness of both parties, and relied on the pleadings in making
his decision.

(Record 312, 523, 623).
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E.

Visitation Rights
Finally, plaintiff claims that the visitation schedule

decreed by the district court was error, and that the defendant
has "verbally declined the Appellant visitation rights on fourteen occasions."

(Brief p. 33). An affidavit by the plaintiff

appears as Addendum 2 of the plaintiff's Brief alleging that the
defendant has not complied with the visitation rights defined by
the decree.
First, the award of visitation rights is within the
trial court's discretion and should be reversed only for abuse of
that discretion.
1980).

Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah

Here, at the insistence of the plaintiff, the court

established a very specific visitation arrangement.
332-342, 372-384, 570-72).

(Record

Exhibit A to the Judgment and Decree

of Divorce (Record 250-54) sets forth plaintiff's visitation
schedule and shows that the trial court rendered a judgment that
was fair to both parties and their children.

Plaintiff has visi-

tation rights including alternating legal holidays, rotating
Christmas and Thanksgiving holidays, and for three weeks during
the summer.

Plaintiff complains about the difficulties with

exercising his visitation rights because the children live in
Colorado (Brief p. 34), but he fails to explain how the trial
court could have more practically and equitably remedied the
problem.

Given the circumstances, including the ages of the

children, the visitation schedule is equitable and should be
upheld.
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Second, plaintiff's affidavit regarding the enforcement
of the terms of the decree is not properly before this Court.
The Court of Appeals does not have the means of adequately
testing the truth of affidavits by examination and crossexamination of witnesses.

Defendant therefore declines to submit

an affidavit to this Court responding to plaintiff's affidavit.
However, less the Court accept the truth of plaintiff's affidavit, defendant hereby represents that she has never denied the
plaintiff child visitation as provided by the decree.

To the

contrary, plaintiff has failed to take advantage of his alloted
visitation rights.

Until a district court has made a factual

determination concerning plaintiff's allegations, this Court
should decline to review plaintiff's affidavit.

Plaintiff's

remedy is a contempt proceeding before the district court.

One

Utah case touches upon the subject of enforcement of divorce
decrees during appeal and implies that the continuing jurisdiction of district courts pursuant to U.C.A. 30-3-5(3) provides the
trial court with enforcement powers even while the proceeding is
on appeal.

Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 footnote 3 (Utah

1980); see also, Enyart v. Comfort, 591 P.2d 709 (Okla. 1979)
(trial court maintains enforcement jurisdiction during divorce
appeal).

U.R.C.P. 60(a) allows for immediate enforcement of

judgments unless a bond is filed, and the district courts are
better equipped to enforce their decrees than the appellate
courts.
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Finally, plaintiff's contentions that the trial court
should have ordered defendant to remain in Utah are without
merit.

(Brief p. 28-32).

Plaintiff is capable of traveling to

Colorado, and the defendant's right to travel should not be
impinged.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (U.S. 1968).

Utah

authority supports the defendant's right to live where she
desires with the children.

Earl v. Earl, 406 P.2d 302 (Utah 1965).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CHILD SUPPORT
AWARD WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Contrary to plaintiff's arguments, (Brief p. 34-41) the
$325 per month per child awarded by the trial court was proper.
The trial court carefully considered the overall situation in
setting the support obligations.

The court weighed the plain-

tiff's earning ability, the defendant's earning ability, and the
expenses of both parties.

(Record 420, 494, 524, 590). The

appellant bears the burden of proving that the trial court abused
its discretion in setting the amount of child support, McCarty v.
McCarty, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979); Mitchell v. Mitchell,
527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974), and plaintiff has failed to meet
that burden here.
Plaintiff's arguments fail to disclose any abuse of
discretion by the trial court, in fact, the record shows that the
court made reasonable provisions for child support.
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The evidence

at trial showed that the plaintiff is a manufacturer representative with net after tax earnings of $24,000 per year (including
the leasehold value of company car furnished to the plaintiff).
(Record 330, 422, 586-597).

The defendant was found to be

capable of earning $700 per month after taxes as a bank teller.
(Record 330, 485-490).
Plaintiff cites Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7(2)
contending that the trial court failed to consider the factors
outlined by statute in setting the support amount.
34-35).

(Brief p.

The record demonstrates that the trial court received

evidence on each of the factors listed in U.C.A. 78-45-7(2).
Plaintiff's Brief, not the trial court, fails to adequately consider and comprehend U.C.A. Section 78-45-7(2).
Much of the record concerns the financial assets and
liabilities of the parties including earnings, gifts, debts and
expenses as they related to the family and including the children.
The court received abundant testimony concerning the income and
assets of the parties.

(Record 422, 425, 442, 466, 470-71,

485-89, 589, 597). The plaintiff argues in essence that because
the defendant's parents have been generous to their
grandchildren, and to the parties themselves, during the marriage
that the plaintiff should therefore have his support obligations
reduced.

(Brief p. 36-38).

Plaintiff's interpretation of U.C.A.

Section 78-45-7(2) would improperly impute the wealth of the
defendant's parents to the defendant in analyzing the relative
financial status of the parties.
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The financial position of the defendant's parents is
not relevant in determining child support and the court below
properly limited his evaluation of the circumstanes to the parties
themselves.

Spector v, Spector, 496 P.2d 864,-(Ariz, App. 1972);

see also Dickens v. Dickens, 187 P.2d 91, 94-95 (Cal. App. 1947)
(court should not consider potential support from other than
parents unless a legal obligation exists); Fine v. Fine, 173 P.2d
355, 358 (Cal. App. 1946) (aid from relatives should not reduce
father's support obligation).

Apparently, Utah courts have not

directly addressed that issue, but the Kentucky Court of Appeals
rejected a husband's argument that his support award should be
lowered because the wife's parents had substantial resources.
The court held:
With respect to the appellant-s suggestion that
the wife's parents should support the child
because they are wealthy we need only say that
we are amazed that such a suggestion could
seriously be made.
Halcomb v. Halcomb, 337 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Kentucky 1960).
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court "placed the
plaintiff in a position where his expenses exceed his income."
(Brief p. 37). He complains that the court improperly valued his
company provided car, miscalculated his tax status and income
level.

The evidence refutes the plaintiff's claims of error.

Plaintiff's own testimony indicated that he had gross income of
$36,490.11 in 1985, (Record 587) and in addition his employer
provided him with a car; his projected gross income for 1966 was
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approximately $33,592.00 including bonuses (Record 595, 591) plus
the company car.

(Record 599). Cross-examination showed that

plaintiff's estimate of his monthly expenses of $3,191.34 (Record
53 6) were inflated, misleading and improperly calculated.
(Record 593-599).

Plaintiff's claim of income "substantially

less than $2,000 per month" (Brief p. 37) is absolutely false and
the court correctly found his net after tax income to be approximately $24,000 per year.

(Record 257).

Plaintiff's complaint

that the value of his company car is not "income" is a technical
distinction without merit.

Certainly, a car for plaintiff's per-

sonal use is a benefit that enhances his disposable income.

The

court received substantial evidence related to the value, costs
and benefits of the car and its effects on plaintiff's situation.
(Record 587-90, 599-601).

The court also considered the defen-

dant's earning capacity in setting the child support award.
(Record 330). No miscalculation occurred.
The authorities cited by plaintiff (Brief 39-40) are
irrelevant to the facts here.

Plaintiff cites Woodward v.

Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1983) (Brief p. 39) representing
that it means that if the custodial parent has no need of child
support the court should relieve the noncustodial parent of support duties.

Actually, the Woodward court held that because the

custodial parent had much higher income than the non-custodial
parent, and because one of the emancipated children was living
with the non-custodial parent, the custodial parent was not
entitled to child support.

Woodward has no relevance here.
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Plaintiff also cites Graziano v. Graziano, 321 P.2d 931
(Utah 1958) contending that where the custodial parent's family
can provide for the children, a small support award is justified.
(Brief 40).

Graziano is factually distinguishable•

There the

husband had been drafted into the army, making very low wages,
and could not have paid much child support regardless of the
wife's situation.

The wife in Graziano had a trust fund and

personally owned other assets.
a low support award.

Thus, the circumstances warranted

Here, plaintiff makes a substantial salary

and is capable of supporting his children in accordance with the
decree.

Plaintiff fails to explain how ordering a father who

makes well over $30,000 per year to pay child support of $325 per
month per child is inequitable.
Finally, plaintiff's argument concerning the court's
award of alimony of $1.00 per year is frivolous.

The court has

broad discretion in deciding whether alimony is appropriate,
Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 1982) and plaintiff
does not seriously argue that the court abused its discretion.
(Brief p. 41).
III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S VALUATION
AND DISTRIBUTION OP
MARITAL ASSETS WAS EQUITABLE
The plaintiff's Brief, Point VIII, claims that the trial
court awarded the defendant 97 percent of the marital estate and
improperly valued the assets.

Plaintiff's arithmetic is inde-

cipherable and his argument fallacious.
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The Utah Supreme Court has said the following concerning
appellate review of property distribution in divorce cases:
The trial court exercises broad discretion in
adjusting the financial needs and property
interests of the parties. The Appellant must
show that the court's award works such manifest injustice or inequity as to clearly be an
abuse of that broad discretion.
King v. King, 717 P.2d 715, 715-716 (Utah 1986).

Plaintiff's

Brief fails to show any abuse of discretion in the court's allocation of property, and the plaintiff resorts to challenging the
competence of the trial court and attacking the veracity of the
defendant.
A.

Household Furnishings
Plaintiff's Brief pages 41 and 42 claims that the court

erred by finding that the defendant's household goods were worth
$5,000.00 instead of $10,000.00.

A review of defendant's Exhibit

"1" shows that the defendant never valued the household goods at
$10,000.00.

Plaintiff's Brief fails to identify which paragraph

of the Findings of Fact erroneously overvalues the household
goods.

The Findings of Fact (Record 257) paragraphs 7 (c) and

(j) are identical to defendant's Exhibit "1" paragraphs 3 and 10.
Thus, plaintiff's arguments are without foundation.
Plaintiff contends that the household furnishings were
worth approximately $31,000.00 (Brief p. 45; Record 555, Plaintiff's Exhibit 15). The court obviously weighed the assertions
of both parties (Record 412, 555-57) but did not accept plaintiff's valuation completely.

The trial judge is in the advan-

taged position of hearing the testimony before he finds facts,
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and his findings should not be reversed simply because he did
accept plaintiff's valuations.

Crofts v. Crofts, 445 P.2d 701,

702 (Utah 1968).
B.

Clothing.
Plaintiff's Brief (p. 42) also complains that the court

erred by assigning no value to defendant's clothing.

Plaintiff

fails to note that his clothing was also found to be of no value.
(Findings of Fact ]\ 7(1); Record 258).

Plaintiff admitted that

he owns clothes (Record 344), but does not complain that the
court found his clothes to be worthless.

Obviously, the court

felt that because neither party owned valuable jewelry (Record
504) determining a value for used clothing would be unnecessary.
Plaintiff cannot seriously argue that awarding the parties their
respective clothing was inequitable.

Moreover, plaintiff failed

to produce evidence showing that there was a great disparity of
value between his clothing and the defendant's.

The court's

finding was sound.
C.

Valuation of the Rental Property.
The parties owned two houses.

Their marital residence

(7389 South 1710 East, Salt Lake City, Utah) and the "rental
property" (7238 South 1710 East, Salt Lake City) which the parties occupied before the purchase of the primary home.
471).

(Record

The court awarded the rental property to the plaintiff and

the marital residence to the defendant, both subject to existing
encumbrances.

(Record 244, 246). Plaintiff argues that the
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trial court undervalued the marital residence, overvalued the
rental property and undervalued the liens on the rental property.
The record shows conflicting testimony on each of these issues
which the court analyzed before rendering its decree.
The value of the residences was not determined by an
appraisal.

(Record 413, 472, 603). Instead, both parties esti-

mated the market values of the houses, with the defendant's
valuation of the marital property being the purchase price.
(Record 413). The plaintiff estimated that the residence was
worth $150,000.00.

(Record 546). Defendant's Exhibit 1 clearly

shows that the defendant disputed the plaintiff's guess that the
residence was worth $150,000.00.

In addition, plaintiff's claim

that the court erred by not finding that the house increased in
value because of improvements (Brief p. 42-43) is nothing more
than unsupported opinion of counsel.

Plaintiff cites nothing in

the record indicating that improvements made to the residence
translated dollar for dollar into enhanced market value.
Plaintiff could have obtained a professional appraisal if he had
desired to support his valuation.

(Record 603). He did not, and

the court's finding was not an abuse of discretion.
The plaintiff claims that the court erred by valuing the
rental property at $79,000.00 (Brief p. 43; Record 257, Findings
of Fact 11 7 (b) ) . Here again both parties were guessing at the
property values because no professional appraisal had been conducted.

(Record 471, 603). The defendant testified that the

parties had placed the rental property for sale with an asking
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price of approximately $84,500.00, but that she was unsure of its
market value.

(Record 472, 743). Plaintiff puts great stock in

a purchase offer of $73,500.00 that the parties did not accept.
(Brief pp. 43-44; Record 552). An unaccepted purchase offer is
certainly not incontrovertible evidence of market value, and
given the conflicting statement concerning property valuation the
court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the house at
$79,000.00.
Another error alleged by the defendant is the court's
finding with respect to the encumbrances on the rental property.
(Brief p. 44). The plaintiff asserts that the court's Findings
of Fact paragraph 7(b) erroneously omitted an encumbrance of
$2 5,000.00 on the rental property owed to Al and Justine Porter,
the defendant's parents.

(Brief p. 44; Record 554). However,

plaintiff admitted at trial that the Porter's $25,000 "encumbrance" had been released.

(Record 553). In addition, the

decree of divorce provides that the plaintiff is to receive the
rental property free of all liens except the existing mortgage
(Record 244; Judgment and Decree of Divorce ]\ 6(a)).
The $25,000 "encumbrance" that the plaintiff alluded to
(Record 553) arises from the purchase of the marital residence.
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 9-p, marked but apparently not received
into the record).

The contract required the parties to pay Al

and Justine Porter $25,000 when the rental property was sold.
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Because that obligation was tied to the purchase of the marital
residence, the defendant assumed the $25,000 obligation when she
was awarded the marital residence.

(Decree ]\ 9; Record 247).

Defendant is obligated to take actions to effectuate the court's
decree, (Record 249) and because plaintiff is not responsible for
the $25,000 obligation to the Porters, the court's valuation was
proper.

Finally, the defendant promised during the hearing on

plaintiff's motion for a new trial that any questions concerning
obligations to the Porters would be resolved by a quit-claim deed
from the Porters.

(Record 362). Thus, plaintiff's arguments are

without merit.
The plaintiff also claims error concerning the court's
finding that the mortgage debt in the rental property was $44,000
rather than $48,000 alleged by the plaintiff.

(Brief p. 44).

Defendant's Exhibit 1 was entered into evidence listing the
mortgage as $44,000—in direct conflict with plaintiff's testimony.

(Record 553) . Here again the trial court was able to con-

sider the conflicting evidence and assess the credibility of the
parties.
1968).

See Crofts v. Crofts, supra, 445 P«2d 701, 702 (Utah
Plaintiff admitted that the $48,000 figure he used was

the balance at the end of 1985, which is a few months earlier
than defendant's financial statement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1).
The trial court's findings carry a presumption of validity Gill
v. Gill, 718 P.2d 779, 780 (Utah 1986), and the plaintiff failed
to enter evidence that would justify disturbing the court's
finding.
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D.

Employee Savings Plan.
The plaintiff also claims that the court overvalued the

savings plan provided through his employer.

(Brief p. 44). The

court found plaintiff's benefits to be worth $9,466 (Findings of
Fact 1| 7(i); Record 258), but plaintiff claims his benefits were
worth only $4,019.20.

(Brief p. 44). Defendant's Exhibit 16-D

(a summary of savings accounts provided by plaintiff's employer)
lists Eddie Ebbert's vested rights as $9,466.31.

Plaintiff was

incapable of formulating a plausable rebuttal to the values
disclosed in Exhibit 16-D.

(Record 602).

Plaintiff's argument

that Exhibit 17-D showed that the plaintiff's vested rights were
worth only $4,019.20 is meritless.

Exhibit 17-D refers to what

the plaintiff's remaining vested rights would be after a
withdrawal effective December 31, 1985. The trial court was well
within its discretion in assigning a value to plaintiff's savings
benefits in light of Exhibit 16-D.

In any event, plaintiff cites

no evidence in the record that effectively refuted the clear
message of the savings plan summary—that plaintiff had $9,4 66.31
in present vested rights as of September 30, 1985.
E.

Lack of Candor.
Plaintiff also attempts to discredit the trial court's

findings because the court apparently trusted the defendant's
testimony in formulating the decree.

Plaintiff's brief states:

"The Appellant demonstrated that the Respondent's testimony
lacked credibility."

(Brief p. 45).
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The record shows that throughout the proceedings the
defendant was forthright, and that subjects about which she was
unsure, she openly admitted.

(See for example, Record 47 3, 422).

By contrast, the trial court explicitly stated that the plaintiff's testimony lacked credibility.

The Court said:

Apparently, Mr. Ebbert, you have this overwhelming need to find out what the judge is
thinking. Well, I'm going to tell you what
the judge is thinking.
...Now, what that indicates to me is—what it
indicates to me and the conclusion to me is
inescapable, and the conclusion is, is that
you have demonstrated a lack of candor with
this court.
(Record 362-63).
Thus, the party with a credibility problem was not the defendant.
F.

Division of the Assets
Plaintiff's last assault on the financial aspects of the

decree is that it does not evenly divide the assets betewen the
parties.

(Brief p. 47). No explanation is given supporting

plaintiff's assertion that the defendant received 97 percent of
the assets.

The Findings of Fact totally undermine plaintiff's

creative arithmetic.

Even assuming the defendant did receive

more than 50 percent of the marital assets this does not mean the
court abused its discretion in dividing the property.
Marital property does not have to be divided equally.
The district court is to look at all the circumstances in making
the division.

"In the distribution of the marital estate there

is no fixed rule or formula."
782 (Utah 1986).

Burham v. Burham, 716 P.2d 781,

Here, plaintiff received a house with an existing
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mortgage as did the defendant.

He retained his employment

retirement benefits accumulated during marriage, and he was
required to pay temporary alimony of one dollar per year for two
years despite the fact that his income is well over $30,000.00
per year plus a company car.

(Record 587).

The parties received

from the defendant's parents during the marriage, substantial
gifts, valued at over $93,000.00, (Record 414, defendant's exhibit 2) and the court stated that the overwhelming majority of the
assets accumulated by the parties were given to them by defendant's
parents.

(Record 329) . The court found that the parties had

approximately $103,900.00 in assets and $10,000.00 in liabilities
for a net worth of $93,700.00.

(Record 259).

The plaintiff

received approximately $42,500.00 of the net worth —
an equitable proportion of the marital estate.

certainly

Defendant received

approximately $49,650.00 of the net worth, which is also a reasonable amount in light of the facts.
of defendant's parents' generosity.

Plaintiff is the beneficiary
He leaves the marriage

owning a house that became the "rental property" only because the
defendant's parents essentially purchased the "marital residence"
for the parties.

(Record 471, 414-15).

Considering these cir-

cumstances, the court's division was reasonable and equitable.
IV.
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD HOT BE
AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES
FOR BRINGING THIS APPEAL
Plaintiff's final contention is that he should be
awarded his attorney's fees in bringing this appeal.
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(Brief p.

48)•

The plaintiff commenced the divorce proceedings and brought

this appeal.

(Record 2, 289). The trial court held that each

party should bear his or her attorney's fees below, and the
plaintiff has failed to justify why that reasoning should be
changed on appeal.
Plaintiff cites Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah
1983) in support of his argument that defendant should be saddled
with plaintiff's costs on appeal because she is "relatively more
able to pay" them.

(Brief p. 48) . In Salvage the Supreme Court

upheld an award of attorney's fees to a wife who was unemployed
where the husband earned $133,370 per year and the wife's only
income was $7,000 in stock benefits.

The facts here do not

approach Savage, and plaintiff's request is without merit.
CONCLDSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in rendering judgment below.

To the

contrary, the court's decree evidences fairness, reasonableness
and practicality.

Therefore, the decree should be upheld.

Plaintiff's affidavits filed with this Court are improper and
should not be considered.
DATED this

1/&

day of June, 1987.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL

JAMES P. COWLEY
H. CHRISTENSI

• JJIUJIAM

Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever penod may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set fortlvur attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall
so order, specifying the time therefor.
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UTAH CODE ANNO l"A VIA)

30-3-5, Disposition of property
Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation —
Termination of alimony
Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
11 When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable ordera relating to the children, property and parties The court ihall
include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children, and
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children
12) The court mayr include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial pareni
<3) The court ha,3 continuing i
I rtion to m4ke subsequent changes or
new orders for fhe support md nil IU nance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental i are r ihe iintnbution of the property as is reasonable and necessary.
4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and i 11 er
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order ot
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former apouse However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the party paying alimony is made a party to the acttion of annulment and his
rights are determined.
6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that t^iat relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
* 7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pn i
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action,
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in
good faith.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Assessment formula for temporary support
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by pnor
court order unless there haa been a material change of circumstance on the
part of the obligor or obligee.
(2) When no pnor court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has occurred, the court m determining the amount of prospective
support, shall consider all relevant factors including but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others.
(3) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all arrearages based upon, but not limited to:
(a) the amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if any;
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and necessanly expended in
support of spouse and children.
(4) In determining the amount of prospective support on an ex parte or
other motion for temporary support, the court shall use a uniform statewide
assessment formula, adjusted for regional differences, pnor to rendenng
the support order. The formula shall provide for all relevant factors which
can be readily identified and shall allow for reasonable deductions from the
obligor's earnings for taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses.
The assessment formula shall be established by the Department of Social
Services and penodically reviewed by the Judicial Council under Subsection 78-3-21(3).
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